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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F. B. SCHICIC and ~fARY EVE 
SCHICK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
J. If. PERRY and ~IARIAN PERRY. 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9246 
STATE~1:El~T OF FA·CTS 
The following facts "\vere ornitted by plaintiffs from 
their statement: 
This action was cornn1eneed by plaintiffs to secure 
a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from 
constructing housing for their horses. (R. 64) 
The action is directed against defendants, irrespec-
tive of the fact that at the time the action was initiated 
horses were kept and maintained at not less than six 
of the twenty residences then occupied in the Cottonwood 
Glade Subdivision. (R. 366) Plaintiffs have determined 
to discriminate against the defendants and have selected 
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the1n as the ones who cannot have horses and barn, while 
sp-ecifically plaintiffs have for years consented to and do 
now consent and acquiesce in three of their contiguous 
neighbors housing and maintaining horses on their lots. 
Plaintiff admitted on cross-exarnination that he told 
Harry Forsey and William Bowerbank that he would 
make no objection to their horses or buildings. (R. 208, 
210) For a description of the horses and buildings main-
tained by neighbors in the area contiguous to plaintiffs' 
lot, the Court's attenton is invited to the testimony of 
William Bowerbank, a member of the legal profession, 
(R. 240) John Hoggan (R. 253) and Harry Forsey 
(R. 264). 
Appellants even tried to persuade others in the ·sub-
division to join in their prosecution of this action but 
without success. Plaintiffs tried to have added to their 
complaint the names of tw"o persons, and finally named 
as plaintiffs "Nelson'' and "Overlade", but these parties 
were dismissed fron1 the acton. (R. :29, 360) Irvin T. 
Nelson, when asked (R. 360): "So, if your name \Yas 
added it \vas without your per1nission ~ ", flatly replied: 
"That is correct." 
Cottonwood Glade is located in the suburban area 
of Salt Lake Cit~~. It is in the Cotton\Yood area approxi-
mately ten n1iles fron1 do":rn-to\Yn Salt Lake, extending 
East fro1n Highland Drive at about 5700 South. (Ex. 10) 
The adjacent property to Cotton\\Tood Glade is O\\~ed 
In large tracts, the o\vners of "Thich have barns and 
horses. ( R. 371) 
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The only testimony in the case concerning the effect 
on the value of real property of Cottonwood Glade \vith 
the right to house and maintain horses \vas that such 
housing and maintaining of horses \vould add to the 
value of the property. (R. 37 4) 
The property was recently zoned under the Planning 
Board of Salt Lake County and by express provision 
Cottonwood Glade Subdivision was included in an area 
permitting not to exceed four horses per lot. (R. 300, 345) 
No complaint is made that the building now con-
structed, completed and housing the horses of defendants 
(R. 122) is not in good taste and in conforn1ity \vith the 
neighborhood and in this regard the trial court expressly 
has found the building to be attractive in design and in 
conforn1ity with defendants' residence. (Finding V; 
R. 131) 
The building restrictions expressly per1nit animals as 
pets or hobbies and expressly permit housing for such. 
(See Par. 5 of Exhibit 1.) The restrictions expressly 
permit livestock to be n1aintained on the property so long 
as they are not kept for commercial purposes. 
Defendants have t\\7 0 blooded horses \vhich are gaited 
and used by defendants for the pleasure of horseback 
riding and also as sho\v horses. The defendants partici-
pate in the various sho\vs in the West competing for 
trophies. The horses and the showing and riding of them 
is a hobby of defendants, and this activity has no con1-
mercial purpose \vhatsoever. (R. 305, 339) 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
NO APPROVAL BY A BUILDING COMMITTEE WAS 
REQUIRED BEFORE CONSTRUCTION AS THE PROVI-
SIONS FOR A . BUILDING ·COMMITTEE EXPIRED JAN-
UARY 1, 1955, AND THE COMMITTEE WAS NOT RE-
ESTABLISHED. 
POINT II. 
THE RESTRI·CTIVE COVENANTS ARE INTERPRETED 
AND CONSTRUED ONLY AFTER GIVING CONSIDERATION 
TO THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT CREATING THE RESTRIC-
TIONS. 
(a) ANY DOUBTS WILL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR 
OF 'THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PRO·P-
ERTY. 
(b) RESTRICTIONS WILL NOT BE ENLARGED BY 
·CONSTRUCTION NOR AIDED BY IMPLICATION. 
(c) A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION WILL BE APPLIED 
FOR BROADER PRIVILEGES IN CASE OF DOUBT. 
(d) A COVENANT WHICH BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
TERMS PERl\i!TS CERTAIN USES NECESSARILY 
PERMITS WHATEVER IS ·CUSTOMARY AND 
NE·CESSARILY INCIDENTAL THERETO. 
POINT III. 
PLAINrriFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF AGAINST ONLY THE DEFENDANT WHEN PLAIN-
TIFFS HAVE FOR YEARS .A.CQUIESCED IN AND CON-
SENTED TO THE SAME ACTS ON THE PART OF NUMER-
OUS OTHERS OF PLAINTIFFS~ ·CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBORS. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES EXPENDED BY DEFENDANTS IN 
DEFEATING BOTH A TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION ARE A PROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGES 
TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN AWARDING 
JlJDGMENT FOR DAMAGES ON A PERFORMANCE BOND 
FURNISHED TO SECURE THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 
IN AN ACTION SEEKING A PERMANEN'T INJUN·CTION 
AS THE SOLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
ARG1JMENT 
POINT I. 
NO APPROVAL BY A BUILDING COMMITTEE WAS 
REQUIRED BEFORE CONSTRUCTION AS THE PROVI-
SIONS FOR A BUILDING •COMMITTEE EXPIRED JAN-
UARY 1, 1955, AND .THE COMMITTEE WAS NOT RE-
ESTABLISHED. 
The covenants provide for a building con1rnittee and 
further provide that the po,vers and duties of the conl-
mittee should cease on and after January 1, 1935. There 
was no necessity for the defendants to secure permission 
of either the lot owners or any purported committee, as 
no such com1nittee has been recreated in accordance with 
the provisions of the restrictive covenants. Paragraph 
3 of said covenants (Exhibit 1) provides in part : 
"The po,vers and duties of such committlee 
and of its designated representatives shall cease 
on and after January 1, 1955. ThereHfter the 
approval described in this covenant shall not be 
required unless prior to said date, and effective 
thereon, a written instrument shall be executed 
by the then record owners of a majority of the 
lots in the subdivision and duly recorded, ap·point-
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ing a representative or representatives who shall 
thereafter exercise the same powers previously 
exercised by said committee." 
By the provisions of Exhibit 2, the plaintiffs seek 
to maintain the position that there was a committee re-
created and that the failure of defendants to secure the 
app-roval of that committee prevented them from pro-
ceeding with their building. It is the defendants' conten-
tion, first, that the building co1nmittee was ne:ver recre-
ated, and second, that the com1nittee never acted either 
favorably or unfavorably; third, that the covenants do 
not prevent defendants from proceeding \vithout ap-
proval; fourth, that the building \vas in complete harmony 
and that there was no basis upon \Vhich defendants should 
have sought permission. 
Exhibit 2 was signed by many people \vho did not 
own any property in Cottonvvood Glade subdivision what-
soever. Signatures of Peglau, Evans, ~Io~~le, Hanson, 
etc. are of no validity whatsoever, as they did not own 
p-roperty in Cotton\vood Glade. 
Exhibit 3 was filed shov.ring the ownership of property 
as of December 30 and 31, 1954:, and as of January 1~ 
1955. Exhibit ~ is dated Dece1nber 30, 1954, a_nd it is 
submitted that Exhibit 3 by the certificate of Security 
Title Con1pany disclo8es the record o\vners as of Decenl-
ber 30, 1954. 
As the restrietive eovenants in tl1e prea1nble ex-
pressly provide that they do not apply to Lot 28, there 
were therefore 32 lots concerned as of Decen1ber 30, 195-±. 
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Exhibit 3 discloses that Harold Gloe and Olive Gloe 
were the owneTs of Lot 12. Arthur Pratt and Ruth G. 
l~ratt were the owners of Lot 8. Arthur Pratt was the 
only owner of Lot 2 who signed. In other words, his 
wife Ruth G. Pratt did not sign Exhibit 2. Harold H. 
Gloe only signed as to Lot 12, and the other owner, being 
his wife Olive Gloe, did not sign. The tabulation under 
Exhibit 3 showed, therefore, that only the ovvners of 
15 out of the 32 lots involved signed the petition. It is 
obvious that there were less than a 1najority of the lots 
that signed Exhibit 2. 
In JJ;J organ v. Sigal, 157 Atl. 412 (Conn.), the 
Court was considering the sufficiency of a document 
waiving covenants in a situation where such waiver would 
be effective when signed by two-thirds of the owners of 
lots. In holding that the signature of one of the tenants 
in common was not the signature of the owner of the 
lot, the Court stated : 
"The consent signed by Hendel ~\vas one per-
taining to an undivided one-half interest in each 
of the lots, subject to partnership equity; and 
that the consent of the 'owners' of either of these 
lots was not obtained." 
In the case of 1J1 erri~tt vs. City of K e~vanee, 51 N.E. 
867, the Supreme ~Court of Illinois was considering the 
sufficiency of a petition concerned with special improve-
ments under an initiating ordinance requiring the signa-
tures of a majority of the owners of property in the 
area to be improved. At Page 869 the Court states: 
"Lots abutting thereon were Ov\rned by married 
women, and the petition was signed by the hus-
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bands of these women in their own names as own-
ers and not as agents of their wives. It also ap-
pears that certain lots abutting upon the im-
provement were owned by several tenants in com-
mon, and that the petition was not signed by all 
of the tenants in common owning such lots. For 
instance, one person, who owned an individual one-
third of a lot, signed the petition as the owner of 
the whole of it. * * * As the evidence shows that 
the petition in this case was not signed by the 
owners of a majority of the abutting property, 
after excluding the signatures so made by married 
men and so rnade by tenants in common, then the 
ordinance prepared by the board of local improve-
Inents and submitted to the city council, and which 
lies at the basis of this assessment proceeding 
was invalid." 
Exhibit 2 commences with the state1nent: "Come 
now the undersigned record o"\vners of lot". The evidence 
shows that Gloe and Pratt signed only their names, and 
where Exhibit 3 shows that these tvro 1nen \Yere not 
the owners of other than a half interest in the lot, the 
owners of that lot had not signed, and such lot cannot 
be included. The finding (R. 13) of the trial court was 
that Exhibit 2 was not signed by a 1najority of the lot 
owners, and also the Court concluded (Conclusion No. 1: 
R. 132) that no building connnittee \Yas legally constituted 
under the restrictions, and that app.roval of the plan 
by a building co1nmittee \Yas no longer required. This is 
the only deternlination the Court could make under the 
facts and the law. 
The purported building committee attempted to be 
established by Exhibit 2 consisted of Bagley, Gloe and 
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Peglau. Harold Gloe, as a 1nember of the committee in 
his third party ansvver, alleged that proper housing had 
been erected and maintained for many years on lots in 
close proociinity to the plaintiffs, but denies that he was 
a 1ne1nber of the co1nmittee at the tirne the lot was sold. 
That would leave Ed\\Tard l\1. Bagley and Glen C. Peglan 
as the only n1embers of the committee. It is obvious that 
the com1nittee itself never acted or could have acted in 
denying any application of defendants, for Peglau states 
(R. 286) that he did not at any time vote to deny the 
application. This is the san1e Peglau \vho had previously 
granted the request of William Bowerbank for housing 
of the Bowerbank horses. (See Ex. 32) 
The significant point is that in his letter (Ex. 7) 
Bagley makes no objection to the building or its design, 
but refers only to the authority of the committee, infer-
ring, therefore, that the com1nittee had no objection to 
the structure. 
Paragraph 3 of the covenants expressly provides 
that in any event if no suit "to enjoin the erection of 
such building, or the making of such alteration, had been 
conrmenced prior to completion thereof, such approval 
will not be required and this covenant will be deemed 
to have been fully complied with.'' 
This is certainly an invitation to any owner to 
proceed until halted by suit. 
The actual fact is in this case that no committee was 
legally constituted and there was certainly no estop~pel 
that could be set up against these defendants, preventing 
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them from asserting the fact that there was no legally 
constituted committee. The committee, in any event, 
could only rule upon the confonnit~ of the structure, 
and the evidence and findings of the Court are clear that 
the housing is in harmony and no objection has been 
made to its design or ap·propriateness. 
POINT II. 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ARE INTERPRETED 
AND CONSTRUED ONLY AFTER GIVING CONSIDERATION 
TO THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT CREAITING THE RESTRIC-
TIONS. 
(a) ANY DOUBTS WILL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR 
OF 'THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PRO·P-
ERTY. 
(b) RESTRICTIONS WILL NOT BE ENLARGED BY 
·CONSTRUCTION NO·R AIDED BY IMPLICATION. 
(c) A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION WILL BE APPLIED 
FOR BROADER PRIVILEGES IN CASE OF DOUBT. 
(d) A COVENANT WHICH BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
TERMS PERMITS CERTAIN USES NECESSARILY 
PERMITS WHATEVER IS ·CUSTOMARY AND 
NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL THERETO. 
The entire position of plaintiffs has been to isolate 
Paragraph 1 of the covenants and ignore all other pro-
visions. It requires no citation of authority for the propo-
sition that the covenants are to be construed after an 
examination of the entire instrument and effect given to 
every provision of the covenants. In this decision (R. 
107) the Court finds that the provisions do not prohibit 
the possessing of family animals such as co""", horse, goat, 
etc. Paragraph 5 of the restrictions contains the state-
10 
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ment that the district is not intended to be divided for 
or used for a commercial area, and for this reason live-
stock and fowls ••tor thi,s purpose" will not be permitted 
in the area. ~Certainly, therefore, livestock and fowls, 
so long as the same are not used for a commercial 
purpose, are permitted in the area. Definitely, as the 
Court determined, the restrictions do not prohibit the 
usual household pets. 
The statement in Paragraph 5, "However, the hous-
ing of such pets must be constructed", etc. constitutes 
an affirmative statement in these covenants that there 
would be housing for the family animals, or the usual 
household animals. 
As stated by the Court in Sporn v. Overholt, 262 
P. (2d) 830: 
~'Another well-settled rule is that covenants 
and agreements restricting the free use of prop-
erty are strictly construed against limitations 
upon such use. Such restrictions will not be aided 
or extended by implication or enlarged by con-
struction. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the 
unrestricted use of property. 14 Am. Jur. Coven-
ants, Conditions and Restrictions, 621, Sec. 212." 
As household animals are permitted under these 
covenants, including horses, and particularly horses as 
a hobby, then it is only reasonable that housing be had 
for such animals. To remove any doubt, however, the 
covenants expressly so stated. 
As stated by the New York ·Court in Premi~(;m Poim.t 
Park Ass'n. v. Polar Bar, 119 N.E. (2d) 360: 
11 
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". . . since the covenant permits the conduct 
of the business itself, the conclusion is almost in-
escapable that it permits whatever is customary 
and necessarily incidental thereto.'' 
It would be unreasonable to adopt the construction 
of these restrictions contended for by plaintiffs to the 
effeet that you can have your animals on the property, 
keep them there twenty-four hours a day, or, as you 
like, throughout the year or otherwise, but you cannot 
build a structure to house them. As the Trial Court 
found, and as the fact in this case, the covenants permit 
housing for the animals so long as it is not "unsightly". 
No objection has been made to the nature and design 
of the barn. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF AGAINST ONLY ·THE DEFENDANT WHEN PLAIN-
TIFFS HAVE FOR YEARS A·CQUIESCED IN AND CON-
SENTED TO THE SAME ACTS ON THE PART OF NUMER-
OUS OTHERS OF PLAINTIFFS' ·CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBORS. 
Judge Jeppson determined that nothing in the re-
strictions prohibited the keeping of the usual household 
pets, including horses, on the lots of this subdivision. 
He further determined that the covenants "\Yere clear 
that housing was intended for such animals and " ... as 
permitted if the housing V\ras in keeping "ith the iinprove-
ments in the area; that it V\ras clear there 'vas no objec-
tion to the design of the structure and that as it was 
in keeping, there could be no legal objection to defend-
ants proceeding with their building. This app·arently 
determined the matter as far as Judge Jeppson 'vas 
12 
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concerned, but there is further reason to sustain the 
decision of the Court in the fact that where plaintiff 
is surrounded by four neighbors who desire horses and 
housing for their horses, he cannot in equity choose only 
the defendants and say, I accept the violation of others 
lJut I will not permit you to have housing for your 
horses. There were many others who kept horses in the 
subdivision, but we are referring now only to the group 
in the immediate area contiguous to plaintiffs' lot. There 
would be Bowerbank, Forsey, Hoggan and the defendants. 
Since 1955 Mr. Bowerbank had kept five horses on 
his property, with corrals and granary. (R. 240) On 
cross-examination plaintiff referred to a conversation 
he had with Bowerbank testifying. "I said to hin1 I 
thought horses or barns would not be permitted but that 
I \Vouldn't have any action against him." (R. 208) 
Since 1956 or 1957 Harry Forsey has kept two or 
more horses on his property, which has corrals and a 
12 x 18 feet plus a lean-to building for the horses, hay 
and equipment. (R. 262-3) 
At R. 210 plaintiff details his conversation with 
Forsey when he told him that he "ranted to be on good 
terms with his neighbors and would make no objection 
to his buildings or his keeping of horses. 
Hoggan, who has the third house south of plaintiff, 
has kept horses since 1956 and has a corral and a house 
with a lean-to for the storage of food, equipment and a 
shelter for the horses. (R. 253) 
13 
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The legal principle is stated by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Wallace v. Hoffman, 84 N.E. (2d )654, at Page 
659: 
"The law is well settled that even where a 
general plan is shown the restrictions under the 
plan will not be enforced where violations have 
been acquiesced in . . . 
* * * 
"The doctrine of acquiescence which will make 
unenforceable an otherwise valid plan of restric-
tion is not based on rudimentary eye-for-eye no-
tions of equity, but upon the proposition that tol-
erated violations of the restrictions \\rill, over the 
course of time, defeat the object of the restriction. 
* * * 
". . . restrictions which interfere ''Tj_th the 
free use of property are not favored in law. . " 
Section 561 of the Restatement of the Law, ,,.. olume 
5, is helpful: 
"Acquiescence by one person in a violation by 
another of an obligation arising out of a promise 
respecting the use of land disables the one so 
acquiescing from enforcing by injunction an obli-
gation of like effect .against a third person when 
the acquiescence has the effect of preventing a 
realization of the benefit sought to be gained by 
the performance of the obligation atte1npted to 
be enforced." 
By \vay of eo1nment on this rule it is stated: 
"Thus 'vhen one person has t"To neighbors 
both of \Yhon1 are subject to like obligations not 
to build neare-r than a certain distance from a 
street and a building by the nearer neighbor up 
to the street line is acquiesced in, the like act of 
14 
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the more distant neighbor cannot be enjoined, 
since no benefit will result from the injunction 
so long as there is acquiescence in the act of the 
nearer neighbor.'' 
The Forsey lot is across a right-of-way to the west 
from plaintiffs' residence. There is an unimp-roved lot 
between the tvvo, but from the front of the plaintiff's 
lot there is an unobstructed view directly into the corral 
and stable and horses kept by Forsey. The Bowerbank 
lot is across the street and to the southvv-est of the 
plaintiffs' lot, and directly across the street from the 
Hoggan property. The other residents maintaining 
horses are to the west of plaintiffs' property. 
As indicated by the Restatement, acquiescence exists 
where there is the intention to tolerate the violation 
of an obligation. Though it is the position of defendants 
with Judge Jeppson that the restrictive covenants do 
not prevent the construction of the housing now erected 
by defendants, nevertheless, admitting for the purpose 
of argument the contention of plaintiff, equity will not 
permit plaintiff to consent to what he clai1ns is a viola-
tion on the part of three neighbors and then atte1npt to 
enforce a contrary position against the fourth neighbor. 
The futility of any benefit arising to plaintiff in 
this situation by granting of an injunction is clearly 
established, for plaintiff has admitted, as he 1nust, that 
the restrictions do permit the keeping of horses on the 
lot and on all lots in the subdivision. If the objection 
is to the sight of horses or the smell of horses, the plain-
tiff is not realistic, because the condition 1nust be much 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
worse, much more out of control, if the animals are 
unenclosed and roaming over the large lots in this sub-
division. If the objection is to the structures other than 
residences, then plaintiff is entirely inconsistent in this 
objection because the record sho\vs the contiguous lots 
to plaintiff have both bath houses, swim1ning pools, 
summer cottages, play houses, stables, corrals, tool sheds, 
etc., and there can be no benefit to be derived by per-
mitting plaintiff to select the defendants as the only 
ones who could not have the benefit of such customary 
buildings in a suburban area while plaintiff acquiesced 
in many others having such privileges. The manner in 
which defendants have kept their horses, the appearance 
and design of the structure, the beautification of the 
lot from the weed patch at the rear of the lot being 
replaced by the improvements is all in the record. The 
significant statement is contained in the only evidence on 
that matter in the case to the effect that the property 
has more value in its rural setting with the right to 
have and house horses than it would have without. 
~Certainly the character of this subdivision in per-
mitting the having of horses and housing for horses is 
clearly illustrated when the member of the building com-
mittee, Harold Gloe, sold to the defendants by ,,~arranty 
deed, \vithout limitation as to the keeping and housing 
of horses, and as set forth in his third party answer 
that the area had developed in p·ern1itting the keeping 
and housing of horses. 
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POINT IV. 
ATTO·RNEYS' FEES EXPENDED BY DEFENDANTS IN 
DEFEATING BOTH A TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION ARE A PROPER ELEMEN'T OF DAMAGES 
TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN AWARDING 
JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES ON A PERFORMANCE BOND 
FURNISHED TO SECURE THE TEMPO·RARY INJUN·CTION 
IN AN ACTION SEEKING A PERMANEN'T INJUN~CTION 
AS THE SOLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
The sole purpose of plaintiffs' action was to secure 
a permanent injunction. At the time they filed the action 
they secured a temporary restraining order, which was 
continued in effect after a hearing pending the final 
determination in this case. All action taken by defend-
ants' counsel in the trial and ap·pearances in this litiga-
tion were for the purpose of securing relief in connection 
'vith the removal not only of the temporary order but 
also of the action to make the temporary order perman-
ent. The record discloses one appearance on the n1otion 
to bring into court the third party defendants. A cursory 
review of the record in this case would clearly indicate 
to any Court a proper perspective as to the tin1e involved 
in connection with the third p·arty proceeding if it "\Vas 
to the effect that a reasonable fee for the services per-
forined by defendants' attorney 'vas $3,130.00. (R. 345) 
The Trial Court specifically found that the sum of 
$1,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the services of de-
fendants' attorney in resisting such temporary restrain-
ing order and securin.g its removal and dismissal. 
It is stated in 28 Am. Jur., at Page 864: 
". . . when the sole and only purpose of the 
suit is to obtain an injunction, and a temporary 
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or interlocutory injunction is issued, counsel fees 
paid or incurred in defending the action at the 
trial, on the merits, are recoverable as damages 
on the injunction bond." 
At Pages 861 and 862 of the sa1ne annotation appears 
the following: 
" . according to the great weight of au-
thority, counsel fees paid for necessary services 
in and about legal proceedings directed to procur-
ing the disposition of an injunction and releasing 
the defendant from its restrictions \vhen reason-
able in an1ount, are recoverable as dan1ages upon 
injunction bonds conditioned in the ordinary terms 
to pay such damages as the obligee n1ay sustain 
by reason of the issuance of the injunction, and 
it is immaterial in such case whether the injunc-
tion is dissolved upon motion or upon a final 
determination of the case on the merits. The 
principle upon which these decisions rest is the 
fact that the defendant had been compelled to 
employ aid in getting rid of .an injust restriction 
imposed upon him by the act of the plaintiff.'' 
In Lee v. Willman, 230 P. 148, at Page 149, the Court 
states: 
"It was cornpetent for the trial court from its 
own knowledge of the value of such service to fix 
the an1ount of the fee." 
Certainly the runount of tin1e spent in this action 
having been detailed to the Court, Judge Jeppson \Yas 
in .an adequate position, and \\ith sufficient lmo,vledge, 
to apportion and allocate the fees for the services in 
securing the dissolution of the injunction in this case. 
The days of trial and the two pre-trial appearances alone 
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'vould more than adequately support the fees the Court 
allowed in this case, \vithout any allocation of time in 
intervievving witnesses, preparing pleadings and re-
search. Certainly these are items of which the Court 
would take knowledge without specific proof and detail, 
especially as this proceeding and the services rendered 
all occurred in connection with proceedings conducted in 
and before this Third District ·Court. 
SUMMARY 
The judgment of the District Court is supported by 
the law and evidence and the order of this Court should 
be entered affirming the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~;~~/~:z~~,Je~-~ 
W1lford')~I~ Burton and 
Reed H. Richards 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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